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INTRODUCTION 
 
Discovery, according to the political theorist, Carl Schmitt, 
“is not a timeless, universal and normative concept,”1 but rather one 
that is limited—bound to a particular historical, even intellectual-
historical situation:  the “Age of Discovery.”2 
Yet, through what means other than by placing Discovery 
within a normative framework can one account for the political 
community which, when deemed to have reached the limits of its 
economic and social efficacy, is imagined as waste or desolate, and, 
as a consequence of that designation, open to radical alteration?  
The European Union, still in the process of emergence from the old 
order of nation states, is a case in point.  Similar to many legal 
entities that have preceded it, the E.U. is being settled by the 
migration of people and by the free movement of other factors of 
production.  Also like so many legal entities that have come before 
it, the European Union survives (even thrives) on a discursive 
terrain, which places emphasis on the failings of the nation-state.  As 
the author Peter Fitzpatrick has remarked, the presentation of the 
nation-state form as “the atavistic, savage nation of warlike and 
divisive assertion”3 paved the way for the emergence of the 
                                                                                                       
*  Professor of Law, Executive Dean, School of Law, Birkbeck, 
University of London.  I would like to express my thanks to the editors—Seth 
A. Klein, Sheila R. Adams, and Jenai St. Hill—for their invaluable work on this 
Essay. 
1  CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 131 (G.L. Ulmen 
trans. 2006). 
2  Id. 
3  PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW 
137 (2001). 
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European Union.  The old, modern Europe had to be conceived of 
as thoroughly bankrupt before it could be appropriated to the 
resolutely post-national and post-modern aims of European 
integration.4 
Schmitt describes and analyzes The Age of Discovery in his 
monograph, The Nomos of the Earth.5  This historical period is but one 
instance of Schmitt’s general proposition that: 
[I]n some form, the constitutive process of a land-
appropriation is found at the beginning of every settled 
people, every commonwealth, every empire.  This is 
true as well for the beginning of every historical epoch.  
Not only logically, but also historically, land 
appropriation precedes the order that follows from it.  
It constitutes the original spatial order, the source of all 
further concrete order and all further law.6   
The age of discovery was a complex and involved history, 
conventionally dated from the early Fifteenth century to the late 
Seventeenth century.  It was an age in which mass migration (not 
classic war or conquest) was deployed to extend the territories of a 
power or, crucially, to engineer “the destruction and/or 
transformation of other forms of social organisation and life”7 of 
communities assumed to be spent and useless.  In spite of the press 
of legal and political theory relating to the EU, which collectively 
and aggressively asserts its sui generis character, it is time for the 
formation of the European Union to be measured against Schmitt’s 
fundamental claim. 
This Essay will assert that, through the migration and 
settlement of people and the movement of goods and capital, the 
savage, bankrupt estate of the old order in Europe has been 
appropriated.  The way in which the member states of the E.U. have 
appropriated territories is similar to the migration and movement of 
units of production to the lands occupied by people considered 
primitive in earlier historical periods and in other geographical 
locations.  Far from witnessing the birth of a political community 
                                                                                                       
4  See, e.g., SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 13-16 (2002). 
5  SCHMITT, supra note 1. 
6  Id. at 48. 
7  CATHERINE HALL, Introduction:  Thinking the Postcolonial, Thinking the 
Empire, in CULTURES OF EMPIRE:  A READER:  COLONISERS IN BRITAIN AND 
THE EMPIRE THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 1, 5 (Catherine 
Hall ed., 2000). 
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without precise historical precedent, the origins of the European 
Union are distressingly familiar. 
 
I. CARL SCHMITT, LAND APPROPRIATION, AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
This Essay does not attempt to suggest that no scholarly 
works exist that seek to interrogate the dominant characterisation of 
the European Union as a wholly unique political and legal entity.  
On the contrary, there is a respectable (but marginal) body of works 
which highlight the EU’s adherence to classic modes of sovereign 
assertion, its embrace of a denigrated notion of citizenship, its 
treatment of resident non-nationals and asylum-seekers, and its 
overwhelming preoccupation with economic actors and spheres of 
activity.8  For example (and in seeming anticipation of this Essay by 
nearly a decade), Etienne Balibar refused to accept that the 
European Union had left behind the legacies of colonialism and 
imperialism that were so integral to the histories of member states of 
the supposed new Europe.9  Indeed, Balibar went so far as to invoke 
the idea of a “European apartheid.”10 
This Essay sits between the claim that the European Union 
has emerged from the old order of Europe and the opposing 
position that the EU is little more than the nation state writ large.  
Under this latter position, the EU is an entity that appears to be 
unlike the nation-state, but rather is one that has folded in its 
member states into a supposedly new polity (the European Union) 
which simply mimics and exaggerates the particular characteristics of 
the nation-state.11  What lies in between these two positions is the 
intriguing truth:  whilst not heralding a new kind of legal and 
political community, the European Union represents the “surprising 
change”12 that Schmitt hoped would come about in legal and 
political thought and practice.   His hope was a much sought after 
(but little anticipated) change that would once again make 
                                                                                                       
8  Id. at 5. 
9  See generally ÉTIENNE BALIBAR, WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE?  
REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP (2004). 
10  Id. at 45. 
11  See Peter Fitzpatrick, New Europe and Old Stories: Mythology and 
Legality in the European Union, in EUROPE’S OTHER:  EUROPEAN LAW BETWEEN 
MODERNITY AND POST MODERNITY 27-36 (Peter Fitzpatrick & James 
Bergeron eds., 1998).  
12  SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 335. 
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“relevant”13 the connection between “nomos”14 and the 
“appropriation of land.”15  
The major contention of The Nomos of the Earth, a significant 
text on the international legal order, was that since the end of World 
War I, the word “nomos” had lost its fundamental relation to land 
appropriation.  As a result, what to Schmitt ought to have been 
inconceivable—economic, political and social systems, anchored 
only by positive legal norms and conventions and not by the 
primary act of land capture—took hold of the political 
imagination.16  Thus, Schmitt would be pleased to learn that the 
force behind the European Union is the plain, old fashion taking of 
territory.  The effective beginnings of the European Union can be 
located in the Rome Treaty.17  At the heart of European integration 
is the assertion of the right of European people to move freely 
across territory, similar to what has been seen in every epoch of 
history.  This is a surprising change indeed, given that the European 
Union is routinely positioned as perhaps the most advanced instance 
of a globalized, deterritorialised space.  The legal notion and practice 
of free movement remain at the core of the European Union’s 
constitutional and substantive fabric.   
As I have argued elsewhere,18 those who seek to 
comprehend the precise legal nature of the European Union make 
much too little of the undeniable fact that the Treaty of Rome, 
which established the European Community, engineered the mass 
exodus of European people who were lured by the promise of 
economic advantage.  Such projects of migration have leant force to 
virtually every legal community at the dawn of their existence.19 
What this intimates, is that the emergence of the European Union 
has not occurred in such a way as to unsettle Schmitt’s claim that 
land appropriation is a condition precedent of the emergence of a 
legal and political community. 
                                                                                                       
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  See id. 
17  Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 (formerly known as the 
Treaty of Rome). 
18  See e.g., Patricia Tuitt, From the State to the Union:  International Law 
and the Appropriation of the New Europe, in EVENTS: THE FORCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Fluer Johns et al. eds., 2010). 
19  Id. at 177. 
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It is indisputable that the European Union marks the 
beginning of a new polity.  However, this Essay disputes the claim 
that the EU is a new kind of political entity. 
The EU is neither simply a continuum of the old order of 
nation states nor a sui generis legal community.  The Rome Treaty put 
in circulation the beginnings of a political force that gestures toward 
the age of discovery.  The key characteristics of this new political 
force are well known:  Over a relatively short span of time, the old 
organisation of independent sovereign states of Europe have seen 
their borders hugely transformed, gradually in some spheres and 
more rapidly in others.  At least in the movement of persons, capital, 
goods and services, the single market has replaced the old 
arrangement of independent and insular economic units.  The very 
question of what geographical limit is comprised within the 
European space (admittedly always highly unstable and contested) 
has been placed more sharply in focus as the expansion of Europe 
appears to know no obvious limit.  
The doctrine of direct effect,20 which allows nationals of the 
EU to rely upon European law directly before their national courts, 
has made not only member states and EU institutions but also 
natural and legal persons, direct beneficiaries of the European 
Union’s legal order.  In virtually every discussion of the nature of 
the new European legal order, such innovations are paraded like 
flags marking its territorial compass.  Of first importance for this 
account, nationals of member states of the EU are encouraged by 
various economically grounded free-movement rights to look across 
their increasingly porous borders to neighbouring locations with 
greedy eyes.  Indeed, it is through their energiestheir desire to 
discover the riches that the new Europe has in storethat has 
spurred the European revolution.  
The Rome Treaty is the principal cause of the new 
distributions within Europe.  It is often dubbed the axis upon which 
the EU revolves, indicating that the Rome Treaty is the primary law 
of the European Union or, to invoke Schmitt again, “the first 
measure of all subsequent measures”21  Hans Lindahl has played an 
important role in taking Schmitt’s work beyond the seemingly 
narrow territorial understanding of space and place.  Lindahl’s 
recent work, in which he attempts to uncover the precise nature of 
                                                                                                       
20  See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW:  TEXTS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS 275 (4th ed. 2008) (defining the criteria for 
establishing direct effect). 
21  See SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 67. 
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the European Union’s territorial form, is instructive.  Thus, 
borrowing from Lindahl, it can be argued that it is through the 
movement of persons that the European Union seeks to enclose 
itself.22  However, as Lindahl cautions, it is not the mere act of 
closure that is important in elucidating the territorial character of 
any emerging polity, but rather the question of what the act gestures 
toward.  To be more specific, any act of closure, which the Rome 
Treaty dispensation instructs, is “buil[t] on a prior closure.”23 That  
itself is conditioned upon the existence of a non-empirically 
grounded place to which any act of closure constantly refers. 
This Essay argues that the non-empirically grounded place 
on which the European Union fixes itself and Schmitt’s intellectual-
historical situation are the same.  Thus, it is in light of Lindahl’s 
prescient observations that this Essay now returns to its point of 
beginningto that something more than mere situated occurrence 
but something less than norm of Discovery.  As Lindahl makes 
clear, the creation of a bounded space is not the result of a concrete 
act of placement but rather of an imaginative space that can 
“function as the origin of the EU only if it is not in empirical space 
and time.”24  This relation between an act of closure and the place to 
which the act of closure must refer if it is to complete itself is 
perhaps best summed up in Lindahl’s assertion that to engineer a 
community within a deterritorialised space is an impossible task, 
because “[a] community mustliterallyfind a place in a 
continuous process of relating to space . . . part of what it means to 
be a community is to have to continuously reinterpret the claim to 
an own place.”25 
Can it be said that the European Union’s own place is to be 
found in constant reference to the period of sovereign appropriation 
that we know of as Discovery?  First, one must take as the 
significant constitutive moment of the European Union the filling 
up of the European space through the movement of the factors of 
production, especially the movement of persons.  If one accepts this 
proposition, then it is at least plausible to suggest that the European 
Union’s own place is one in which the primary value, the intuitive 
sense, relates to the omnipresent need to enjoin European citizens 
in the task of effecting radical change over territory that is both 
                                                                                                       
22  Hans Lindahl, Finding a Place for Freedom, Security and Justice:  The 
European Unity and Its Claim to Territorial Unity, 29 EUR. L. REV. 461, 473 (2004). 
23  Id. at 476.  
24  Id. at 479. 
25  Id. at 465.  
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covered and governed.  In short, there is no better description 
found of the European Union’s claim to an own place than in the 
Nomos of the Earth.  To reiterate the claim:  The European Union, 
surprisingly for some, is the contemporary instance of a type of 
sovereign constituting that even Schmitt thought had effectively 
passed into history.  Schmitt’s reluctant acceptance that the era of 
land appropriation, by the time of his writing, had ended was closely 
tied to the conviction that the international order had effectively 
surpassed “the problems of founding anew and of transition” and 
had reached “some degree of calculability and security”26 
In modern times, some of the most concentrated set of 
interrogations into modes of founding, constituting, and transition 
have been posed in relation to the European Union.  Even the most 
unschooled student of law cannot avoid encountering reams of 
paper devoted to an analysis of the legal character of the European 
Union.  Its emergence, then, confounds Schmitt’s belief that the 
political climate in which he wrote his thesis afforded no new 
political beginnings.  The creation of the EU shows however that 
Schmitt correctly believed that where a new beginning is possible “in 
some form, the constitutive process of land-appropriation is found . 
. . ”27  According to Schmitt, the movement of the world into a 
realm of calculation would bring an end to the era of constituting.  
Chief among the many features of the post War international order 
which, as perceived by Schmitt, has caused Nomos to lose “its 
energy and majesty”28 in modern constitutional theory and practice 
is the perceived end of the logical possibility and practical 
opportunities for land-appropriation. 
And, in truth there are no spaces on earth that have not 
been covered and governed.  However, recognizing this fact does 
not mean one necessarily has to accept that the era of constituting 
has passed.  Rather, the question becomes in what manner such 
populated and governed spaces can still be appropriated.  To answer 
this question, one must first appreciate that, as the discovery of the 
new world attests to, land appropriation can never exhaust itself 
merely by virtue of the finite nature of literal space.  A great portion 
of the history that Schmitt deals with, in the section of Nomos 
devoted to the discovery of the new world, reveals how land-
appropriation can operate in the face of a world, the separate units 
of which have once been appropriated, its lands already divided, 
                                                                                                       
26  See SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 341. 
27  See id. at 48. 
28  Id. at 67. 
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populated, and governed.  If land-appropriation historically and 
logically precedes the settlement of any new political entity, then the 
question of how to appropriate an already appropriated world is one 
that logically was posed at the emergence of the European Union:  a 
polity which indisputably arose from the densely populated and 
extensively governed territories of Europe.   
Confronted with an earthly limit, post-war Europe saw in 
the degenerate nature of its existing political forms and its 
ineffectual economic structures a new Europe.  Seen from the 
vantage point of the place against which the seeds of the European 
Union was born, new cannot be understood to denote the thing or 
entity that will arise from the degradation of the old order of nation 
states in Europe.  Rather, it is evocative of a figuratively empty 
space, a point of transition and renewal.  The new Europe, then, was 
a space that was ripe for change—not literally empty, but used up or 
misused.  When we speak of the new Europe it is in a kind of 
shorthand to characterize the old arrangement of nation states as 
spent or obsolete.  To be designated new is to bear the taint of the 
barbarian.  The term “new” underscores a political and social order 
that has reached the limit of political efficacy. 
 
II. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY DISCOVERY 
 
If Discovery is properly thought of as both an intellectual 
and historical situation, then it is difficult to ignore certain features 
of the emergence of the European Union.  In particular, one cannot 
ignore the primacy of the four freedoms of the Treaty of Rome, 
which suggest that this intellectual situation has not disappeared.  
The intellectual situation that remains in political thought today and 
which the European Union claims as its own place through the act 
of closure that comes with the grant by the Treaty of Rome to the 
peoples of Europe to set forth on a discovery of the European 
space, is that which comes through as a legacy from the so-called 
golden age of discovery.  All the certainties of the age have been 
brought forward to the present, above all the belief that any 
community which does not beckon towards the modern is 
effectively an empty space and of no account.  In such a state, there 
is no enemy to conquer and no people with whom to negotiate a 
settlement.  In such a state, it is possible to create a concrete order, 
not through invasion and conquest, but through migration and 
settlement. 
The state of post-war Europe need not be exaggerated:  It 
was not a barren wasteland, populated by men in bearskins.  Rather, 
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what was to be transcended in the Discovery of Europe was the 
unwanted shadow of the modern at the dawn of the post-modern.  
The imperial continuum exists in the mode of the proposed 
settlement of the new Europe, which essentially is through 
migration of a particularly ruthless and frenzied momentum.   
It is that process of constituting—that place which the 
European Union makes its own—that helps us make sense of the 
extraordinary prominence of free movement rights in the fashioning 
of the new Europe and the almost tyrannical pressure placed upon 
EU citizens to travel around the ever-increasing spaces of the new 
Europe.  The appropriation of Europe to the exigencies of the 
European Union has occurred in the time-honoured fashion of 
encouraging the most courageous (most often too the economically 
advantaged) to test the new spaces to discover to what extent its 
seeming dissolution can yield hidden riches.  The European Union 
surely presents us with a basis on which to question the wisdom of 
Schmitt’s claim that “discovery . . . is not a timeless, universal, and 
normative concept.”29 
                                                                                                       
29  SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 131. 
